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Evidential Critieria of Homology for Comparative Psychology 
 
Abstract: While the homology concept has taken on importance in thinking about the nature 
of psychological kinds (e.g. Griffiths 1997), no one has shown how comparative 
psychological and behavioral evidence can distinguish between competing homology claims. 
I adapt the operational criteria of homology to accomplish this. I consider two competing 
homology claims that compare human anger with putative aggression systems of nonhuman 
animals, and demonstrate the effectiveness of these criteria in adjudicating between these 
claims.  
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1. Introduction 
Many emotion researchers and theorists have suggested that anger is an innate 
adaptation that may be shared with nonhuman animals (e.g. Ekman 1999; Sell, Tooby, and 
Cosmides 2009). This raises the question of which behaviors might be manifestations of 
anger in non-human animals. Given the tight link between anger and aggression in humans, 
some aggression researchers propose that innate patterns of aggression in nonhuman animals 
are manifestations of anger. In other words, they propose that the system responsible for 
these phenomena is homologous with human anger, meaning that these complex traits are 
derived from a common ancestral trait. 
As plausible as this may sound, there have been two incommensurate proposals along 
these lines, and there has been little progress in adjudicating between them. According to the 
ethological hypothesis, a repertoire of confrontational behaviors observed in “resident”, 
territory-holding, rats reflects “an underlying emotional state” that is a primitive version of 
anger (Blanchard and Blanchard 1984, 17 see also; Blanchard and Blanchard 1988; 
Blanchard and Blanchard 2003). This behavioral repertoire is set in opposition to avoidance 
behaviors observed in intruder rats, which reflect fear. Moreover, the hypothesis holds that 
these two distinct emotional systems provide the best way of understanding angry aggression 
and fearful aggression in humans. Another proposal, the neurophysiological hypothesis is 
that human experiences of anger “emerge” from a pan-mammalian brain system that 
produces defensive behaviors that are elicited when areas within the ventral hypothalamus 
(among other areas) are electrically stimulated (Panksepp and Biven 2012; Panksepp 1998; 
Panksepp and Zellner 2004). These behaviors are set in opposition to predatory behaviors, 
  
which are neurally dissociable from the defensive behaviors. In other words, this hypothesis 
holds that there are two neural systems for aggression, and that one of them, the defensive 
aggression system, provides the primary neural substrate for human anger and is the 
proximate cause of “the feeling states and behavioral acts” (Panksepp, 1998, p. 14) 
distinctive of human anger. Moreover, the proponents of this hypothesis claim that we can 
best understand certain types of human aggression, impulsive and instrumental forms of 
aggression, in terms of the neural systems for defense and predation, respectively. 
Importantly, these hypotheses are incompatible. Within the neurophysiological 
tradition, the neural dissociation between predatory and defensive aggression is the main 
reason to consider them fundamental, distinct categories of aggression. However, 
confrontation and avoidance behaviors do not exhibit this kind of clean neural dissociation 
(Siegel 2004, chap. 1). Moreover, the kinds of defensive aggression in rats produced by 
electrical brain stimulation is distinct from the aggression observed in ethological research in 
the sense that it lacks features that are diagnostic of these forms of aggression (e.g. Kruk 
1991). In other words, the aggression phenomena identified by these different research 
programs are behaviorally distinct and distinct neural mechanisms are responsible for them. 
As a result, they make incompatible inferences about what anger is and, more specifically, 
about which aggression phenomena are its manifestations. The bimodal classification 
schemes for aggression (defensive versus predatory and confrontational versus avoidant) that 
distinguish these respective phenomena are incommensurate.   
While proponents of these hypotheses aim to identify homologies, there has been 
little progress in adjudicating between them. There are two reasons for this. One is the target 
  
problem: they have not carefully identified the human psychological trait that is the target of 
comparison. Another is the evidence problem: it is unclear how cross-species comparisons 
support homology claims. More specifically, it remains obscure how comparative evidence 
can play a role in adjudicating competing homology claims. While the issues pertaining to 
the target problem have received a good deal of attention in philosophy of biology, the 
evidence problem has been neither raised nor resolved. In this paper, I show a way forward 
by developing evidential criteria of homology and an evidential constraint on homology 
claims. I then apply these criteria to the case of human anger and animal aggression to make 
it clear how hypothesis testing can proceed. 
In the following section, I say more about homology thinking. Homology thinking is 
a historical mode of thinking that explains similarities by appealing to common descent. To 
understand what kind of evidence supports homology, I point out a range of hypotheses with 
which it competes and set out the kind of evidence that favors homology over and above 
them. The operational criteria of homology (Remane 1971) can be understood as identifying 
similarities that provide evidence for homology over and above these competing hypotheses. 
When the criteria are used in this way, I refer to them as the evidential criteria of homology. 
In section 2, I briefly address the target problem. Then I show how the evidential criteria of 
homology apply to the case of human anger and the aggression systems of nonhuman 
animals. A straightforward application of the criteria provides stronger support for the 
ethological hypothesis. Basic human anger has several similarities with the confrontational 
behaviors of resident rats, which provide some evidence that these traits are a product of 
common ancestry. On the other hand, there is currently no evidence that the defensive 
  
aggression system uniquely corresponds with human anger. The similarities identified by the 
neurophysiological hypothesis hold not only with anger but also with other human emotions, 
such as fear. I conclude by highlighting the value of cross-species comparison for specifying 
psychological kinds. 
 
2. Homology and its Competitors 
Though the concept of homology is crucial to evolutionary thinking, it was conceived 
in the service of biological taxonomy prior to Darwin's time. Owen (1846) thought of 
homology as the sameness of an organ or structure in different organisms under every form 
and function. A common example of homology is the skeletal anatomy of the vertebrate 
forelimbs. The radius and ulna are bone structures that are common to bats, chimps, giraffes 
and manatees even though their forms and functions are dramatically different among these 
animals (see Figure 1). They can be more or less dense, thicker or thinner, longer or shorter, 
(though their spatial relationship to other bones of the forearms are preserved) and they can 
contribute to the different functions of swimming, flying, running and grasping in different 
organisms. So the radius and ulna are the same traits that occur in different animals, even 
though they have widely varying forms and functions within these various animals.  
Now that evolutionary thinking has been integrated into biological systematics, one 
prominent idea about homology is that homology is a causal-historical concept (see 
Ereshefsky 2012 for a clarification and defense of this claim). Specifically, a homology 
refers to traits of various animals that derive from a trait of a common ancestor. In this way, 
shared ancestry is the common cause of each homologue, and this common cause explains 
  
similarities between the homologous traits. In the words of one biologist (with some help 
from Darwin), homology is “…grounded in ‘descent, with modification,’ a process that 
belongs to the past.” (Rieppel 2005, 24)  
 
Figure 1. The bones of some mammalian forelimbs. The radius (green) and ulna (red) 
are the same kind of bone, which takes on different forms and functions in different 
animals. 
As a causal-historical concept, we can identify and refer to a homology without 
having or requiring detailed knowledge of the developmental and hereditary mechanisms that 
give rise to it, just as we can refer to a disease entity, such as measles or chicken pox, without 
knowing about its underlying causes (Putnam 1969). Nonetheless, we learn more about each 
homology as we learn more about its underlying causes, just as we learn more about chicken 
pox as we learn more about the virus that causes it. 
  
Given the causal-historical nature of homology, there is a vast range of evidence that 
could bear on whether or not one trait is homologous to another. Some of the best evidence 
pertaining to homology comes from cladistics. If one has an independently established 
phylogenetic tree, one can look at the distribution of a candidate homology, or character, on 
that tree. If, for instance, the existence of a homology is more parsimonious than convergent 
evolution on one or more occasion, then there is a strong reason to think that a trait is 
homologous.  
Nevertheless, before we can even look at the distribution of a character on a 
phylogenetic tree, we need to know how to identify the character in each taxon, which 
becomes a tricky matter when dealing with behavioral and psychological characters. For 
instance, knowing that humans have anger, that rats have a confrontation system, and that 
cats have a defensive aggression system does not determine which of these capacities are the 
same trait or character.  
One way of addressing this problem is to use the operational criteria of homology. 
These criteria need not function as a definition of homology but instead we can use them to 
establish a consistent set of methods for ascertaining homologies and by extension, identical 
traits. The criteria of homology attempt to identify particular kinds of similarity, the kinds 
that are best explained by common history over and above a range of competing hypotheses. 
For any given similarity across clades, there are several hypotheses in competition with 
homology. One is that the similarity is only by chance. Another more probable possibility is 
that convergent evolution explains the correspondence. When a similarity is explained purely 
by convergent evolution, we have a clear case of analogy. Still another possibility in the 
  
behavioral domain is that similarity is explained by plastic developmental processes, 
particularly learning. In the clearest cases of plasticity, similarity can be explained entirely by 
convergent learning or development, perhaps shaped largely by task demands or shared 
developmental mechanisms.1 The main competition is thus between hypotheses of homology, 
analogy, and developmental plasticity. Insofar as they function as evidence, the criteria of 
homology should help pick out similarites between traits that are explained by common 
ancestry and not convergent evolution or plastic developmental processes. 
The most prominent criteria for homology were developed by Adolf Remane (1971) 
and can be deployed for this purpose. Consider first the criterion of position. The criterion 
applies to the radius and ulna because even with different forms and functions across 
different organisms, they retain their relative position to other bones of vertebrate forelimbs 
(humerus and the bones of the wrist). It would be highly unlikely for these characters to have 
evolved de novo in each of the different animals that possess it and yet to have the same 
relative position to other structures. Moreover, there is no shared function across the different 
animals which possess this character that would explain the correspondence. While 
corresponding position sounds like a spatial property, it is actually topological, and can 
include corresponding positions in temporal sequence or corresponding positions across 
cognitive architectures (e.g. “boxologies”). 
The criterion of special quality concerns “…shared features [that] cannot be 
explained by the role of a part in the life of the organism. The fact that in the vertebrate eye 
the blood supply to the retina lies between the retina and the source of light is a famous 
                                               
1 See Brown (2013) for a detailed discussion of the difficulties (e.g. due to the plasticity and transformability of 
behavior) in applying the criteria of homology to behavior. 
  
example of a ‘special quality’.” (Griffiths 2007, 648) The more complex a shared quality is, 
the less likely that they would have evolved independently. The location of blood supply to 
the vertebrate retina is both complex and non-essential (and even slightly counterproductive) 
given the functional role of the retina (what it is used for in the organism), so it identifies a 
correspondence that provides strong evidence that the various instances of this character 
derive from common descent. 
Finally, the criterion of intermediate forms allows identification of homologous 
forms, A and C, because of the existence of one or more transitional states, B1...Bn, between 
the two forms. In many cases, the homology between transitional forms, say between A and 
B1 or between B1 and B2, is determined by applying the other two criteria. For instance, there 
are transition states between the bones of the mammalian inner ear and the bones of the 
reptilian jaw. We know this because the bones of the reptilian jaw share the same position 
(relative to other bones of the jaw) as the bones of several intermediate forms, some of which 
share the same position as the bones of the mammalian inner ear. 
For my purposes, an important constraint on homology claims derives from the fact 
that some homologies are nested within other homologies. For instance, the class of tetrapod 
forelimbs is nested within the class of paired appendages. Thus, the forelimbs of reptiles, 
amphibians, mammals and avians are members of the homology class of tetrapod forelimbs, 
but they are also members of the more inclusive homology class of paired appendages, which 
also includes the pectoral fins of sharks and teleosts. While pectoral fins are homologous 
with instances of tetrapod forelimbs as paired appendages, the similarities between pectoral 
fins and tetrapod forelimbs do not provide evidence for homology at the less inclusive level 
  
of tetrapod forelimbs. Inclusion in this more specific class is indicated by bone structures that 
are absent in pectoral fins. These structures are due to modifications that occured subsequent 
to the divergence of tetrapods from teleosts, and that is why teleost pectoral fins are not 
included in this homology class.  
As a result, some similarities only indicate inclusion in a broader homology class (e.g. 
paired appendages), whereas other similarities indicate inclusion in narrower homology 
classes (e.g. tetrapod forelimbs). In other words, some similarities (e.g. those between 
pectoral fins and forelimbs) only provide evidence for inclusion in broader homology classes 
(e.g. paired appendages rather than tetrapod forelimbs). It follows that, when evaluating 
similarities between traits, it is sometimes necessary to consider which homology class a 
similarity indicates.  
From these considerations, we can derive an evidential constraint on homology 
claims. To see this, consider the correspondences between a human forelimb and a feline 
hind limb. The criterion of position is satisfied, because there are similarities between the 
parts (e.g. between humerus and femur). There are relations of homology between these 
traits. They are homologous as mammalian extremities and tetrapod extremities. 
Nevertheless, if we were to specify the homology class as one that includes human forelimbs 
but excludes human hind limbs, the similarity in question does not provide evidence for 
homology at this level.2 This is because there are no similarities between the human forelimb 
and cat hind limb that are not also shared between the human forelimb and hind limb. Thus, 
to provide evidence for relations of homology at the level of some homology class G (in this 
                                               
2 For similar reasons, we also do not have evidence here for a relation of homology that would include feline 
hindlimbs but not feline forelimbs. 
  
case, the homology class that includes forelimbs but excludes hindlimbs) as opposed to the 
more inclusive class, H (in this case, homology classes that includes forelimbs and 
hindlimbs), requires that some similarities between relata are not shared by traits in the more 
inclusive class, H. I call this an “evidential constraint” on homology claims. 
While the examples so far deal straightforwardly with morphology or body structure, 
all three of Remane’s criteria have also been applied to behavioral and psychological traits by 
ethologists (for overviews, see Ereshefsky 2007; Wenzel 1992). I suspect that what seems 
obvious concerning morphology might be easily confused concerning behavior or 
psychology. As a result, one could find evidence that psychological traits are homologous, 
but misidentify the homology class that this evidence supports. One way of doing so is to 
violate the evidential constraint above. I will argue that the neurophysiological hypothesis is 
an instance of this mistake. As yet, there is no evidence that the defensive aggression system 
identified by neurophysiological research is a member of the homology class that includes 
anger but excludes other human emotions. This is because the hypothesis does not identify 
any similarities that are not shared with other human emotions. I spell out the details of this 
argument in the following section. 
In summary, homology is a causal-historical concept, and homology thinking is a way 
of providing historical explanations for observed similarities between biological traits (or 
characters). The evidential criteria for homology can isolate evidence pertaining to this kind 
of historical explanation. In the following section, I show how the evidential criteria can 
discriminate between the two hypotheses laid out in section 2. 
 
  
3. Which Kinds of Aggression are Manifestations of Anger? 
Before I apply the criteria to the two comparative hypotheses, I will first say 
something about the target problem, the problem of specifying the psychological trait that is 
the target of comparison. For the sake of space, I assume that the appropriate target of the 
ethological and neurophysiological hypotheses is basic human anger, the cluster of 
properties associated with involuntary facial expressions of human anger (Ekman 1999; 
Griffiths 1997). To briefly defend this choice, this is the most closely studied set of “anger” 
phenomena the structure of which is likely explained by inheritance, therefore it is the most 
plausible target for homology claims. This is because homology claims identify traits across 
taxa that are inherited from a common ancestor. One might say that inheritance is one of the 
causal homeostatic mechanisms that preserve the structure of homologous traits across 
lineages (cf. Assis and Brigandt 2009; Brigandt 2009). Thus, if there is something like anger 
in non-human animals, then it is most likely to correspond with phenomena in humans that 
are explainable by inheritance, namely basic human anger.  
Now we are in a position to evaluate the two hypotheses. Recall that the two 
hypotheses focus on different sets of phenomena. The ethological hypothesis focuses on 
patterns of confrontational behavior of territory-holding, “resident” rats, whereas the 
neurophysiological hypothesis focuses on patterns of defensive behavior elicited by electrical 
brain stimulation. The ethological hypothesis lumps its phenomena together according to 
contrasting motives of behavior (confrontation versus defense), whereas the 
neurophysiological hypothesis lumps its phenomena together according to dissociable neural 
  
substrates of behavior (regions of the hypothalamus that elicit defense behavior versus 
distinct regions that elicit predation behavior).  
First, consider the ethological hypothesis. The strongest pieces of evidence for 
homology is a special quality that is shared by rats and stumptail macaques. Adams and 
Shoel (1981) note that dominant macaques and resident rats both implement strategies aimed 
at accessing the back and biting it. In macaques, this behavior seems arbitrary with respect to 
the (probable) function of inflicting non-lethal damage on the subordinate. Macaques have a 
much larger repertoire of bodily movements than rats, many of which could serve the 
function of inflicting non-lethal harm (pushing, kicking, scratching, slapping, holding etc.). 
Thus, back-biting is a special quality, and the best explanation of this behavior may appeal to 
products of common ancestry. In other words, the reason that the attacks of both rats and 
macaques are aimed at biting the neck and back may be that they share a common ancestor 
with a corresponding aggressive strategy and perhaps similar motivational mechanisms for 
negotiating intraspecific conflict.3 There is some evidence that human anger includes an 
impulse to approach and attack, but no one has demonstrated that the impulse is pan-cultural 
or species-typical.4 
While Adams and Schoel did observe several facial expressions of subordinate 
macaques, they did not note any facial expressions that uniquely accompanied the attacks of 
a dominant macaque. However, in more ecologically valid studies of macaque behavior, 
macaques with higher dominance status do display facial expressions toward lower ranking 
                                               
3 Adams and Schoel argue for homology by considering similarity in the dynamic of attack and submission 
across both species. 
4 See e.g. Carver and Harmon-Jones (2009); Baron (1971); Berkowitz et al (1981); and Pedersen et al (2011).  
  
macaques in aggressive encounters, expressions that resemble anger expressions in humans 
(Chevalier-Skolnikoff 1974).5 Chevalier-Skolnikoff (1973) argues that two of these 
expressions are similar (utilizing homologous action units) across macaques, chimps, and 
humans. Some confirmation of these comparisons has been attained by comparison using a 
facial action coding system to quantify chimpanzee facial expressions (Parr et al. 2007). 
Thus, there is continuity across the intermediates for some components of putative 
aggression systems across the common ancestors of these species.  
Now consider the neurophysiological hypothesis. The problem is that the case for 
homology is incomplete. First, there is some evidence for correspondence that has continuity 
across intermediates: stimulation of the hypothalamus of cats, possums, rats and marmoset 
monkeys leads to similar forms of attack (Roberts, Steinberg, and Means 1967; Bergquist 
1970; Panksepp 1971; Woodworth 1971; cited in Lipp and Hunsperger 1978).6 However, 
ethical and practical considerations make it nearly impossible to obtain evidence concerning 
the effects of hypothalamus stimulation in humans. It remains uncertain whether it would 
leads to attack or to any of the other concomitants of human anger (e.g. experiences of anger, 
facial expressions of anger, or physiological changes associated with anger, as distinct from 
fear). Nor have any of these studies observed distinctive facial expressions that indicate 
continuity with human anger.7  
                                               
5 Chevalier-Skolnikoff calls these expressions “stare”, “round-mouthed stare” and “open-mouthed stare”. 
6 Delgado (1968) produced aggressive behaviors with electrical stimulation of the thalamus and cerebellum of 
chimpanzees and macaques. However, these brain structures are notably absent from the neurophysiological 
hypothesis and its descriptions of brain structures involved in aggression. Moreover, Delgado and colleagues 
did evaluate facial expressions. However, these facial expressions were not analyzed.  
7 It is compelling that in macaques, stimulation only results in attack under certain conditions (Alexander and 
Perachio 1973), some of which depend on whether the electrical stimulation occurs in the presence of a higher 
or lower ranking conspecific (attack being more likely in the latter case). Neverthless, one cannot conclude from 
  
There is some evidence that amygdala stimulation can produce feelings of anger (e.g. 
Hitchcock and Cairns 1973). This evidence is even bolstered by the fact that stimulation of 
the medial amygdala in cats can potentiate defensive behaviors elicited by electrical 
stimulation of the hypothalamus (e.g. Shaikh, Steinberg, and Siegel 1993). However, several 
other emotional experiences beside anger have also been reported as a result of amygdala 
stimulation in humans, including anxiety, guilt, embarrassment, jealousy, and a “desire for 
flight or escape” (which is more strongly associated with human fear, see Frijda, Kuipers, 
and ter Schure 1989). It seems that current evidence does not support a distinct localization 
of anger-like and fear-like feelings or behaviors within the HAA or in the other brain 
structures that make up the defensive aggression system (in cats or otherwise). Thus, the 
evidence from brain stimulation does not reveal a unique correspondence with human anger; 
one that is not also shared with other human emotions.  
Second, consider the criterion of position. As with the offensive attack observed in 
ethological work, physiological arousal and threat signals do occur prior to defensive attacks 
elicited by electrical brain stimulation. However, no evidence has been presented that either 
the signals or physiological arousal involved in these attacks are homologous with these 
                                                                                                                                                 
this that this form of aggression is of a piece with the aggressive syndrome which includes angry facial 
expression. It is quite possible that there are several forms of impulsive aggression that an animal might inflict 
only upon lower ranking conspecifics, including pain induced aggression, fear induced aggression or perhaps 
even disgust induced aggression. Neither is it obvious that any of these forms of aggression are of the same kind 
as angry aggression. By contrast, the work of Adams and Schoel (1981), and Chevalier-Skolnikoff (1973) 
describes a certain kind of offensive or dominance-related aggression with which angry facial expressions are 
associated. The same is not true of aggression elicited by electrical brain stimulation. The connection with 
angry facial expressions has not been made, nor has the behavioral syndrome been carefully circumscribed in 
ecologically valid conditions in most of the organisms in which it has been observed. Leyhausen (1979) has 
done this work concerning defensive aggression in cats, but he distinguishes this form of aggression from an 
offensive form of aggression that includes a back-biting attack. I suspect that this latter form of aggression is 
more comparable to the confrontation system in rats (cf. Blanchard and Blanchard 1984). 
  
components of human anger as opposed to human fear. Moreover, it seems unlikely that any 
such evidence will materialize.  
This becomes apparent when we look closely at the work of Siegel and others on the 
HAA, which is cited as support for the neurophysiological hypothesis (Panksepp 1998, 
2012). In fact, Siegel does not advocate the neurophysiological hypothesis, and in many 
cases makes claims that constitute evidence against it. In several places (including Siegel 
2004) Siegel compares defensive behaviors with a disorder known as Episodic Discontrol, 
which is marked by “...decreased impulse control – a characteristic common to defensive 
behavior – and altered perceptual states following stimuli evoking anger, fear or rage.” 
(Siegel and Victoroff 2009, 213 emphasis mine) Indeed, many of the similarities that are 
noted between defensive behaviors and these forms of human aggression are characteristics 
of affectively driven behavior in general. Impulsivity is a characteristic of many kinds of 
emotion expression (see e.g. Frijda 1986), including fear, anger, sadness, and joy. Thus, the 
position criterion is not satisfied in a way that provides evidence for a homology between the 
defensive aggression system and anger that is not also shared between human anger and 
human fear.  
By contrast, manifestations of the confrontation and avoidance systems in rats can be 
distinguished by quantifiable differences in the facial expressions of residents and intruders 
(Defensor et al. 2012), just as manifestations of anger and fear in humans can be 
distinguished by their distinctive facial expressions (e.g. Ekman and Friesen 1971). 
Moreover, resident and intruder rats have distinct forms of attack with distinct target sites. 
Thus, it is possible to distinguish within rats at least two different patterns of impulsive 
  
behaviors accompanied by distinct facial expressions. Moreover, some of the similarities 
between confrontation behaviors and angry behaviors in humans are not shared with fearful 
behaviors in humans or avoidance behaviors in rats. In other words, human anger and the 
confrontation system in rats do not violate the evidential constraint on homology claims 
(relativized to a homology class that only includes the emotion of anger) because they satisfy 
the evidential criteria of homology in ways that are not also satisfied by other emotions like 
fear. A related virtue of the ethological hypothesis is that it can distinguish angry aggression 
from the widely acknowledged category of fear-induced aggression (see esp. Moyer 1976). 
The same cannot be said for the neurophysiological hypothesis. I suspect that at least some of 
the phenomena identified by the neurophysiological hypothesis reflect behavioral outcomes 
of fear, rather than (or perhaps in addition to) anger.  
In sum, the case for homology between the defensive aggression system and anger 
(with respect to a category that includes anger but not other human emotions) may be similar 
to the case for homology between the cat hind limb and the human forelimb (with respect to 
a category that includes human forelimbs but not human hind limbs). The similarities so far 
observed do not evince a homology relation that excludes other emotions (especially fear), 
whereas the case for homology between the offensive attack system and anger does evince 
such a relation. 
 
4. Conclusion 
I have argued that the available evidence supports a homology between human anger 
and the confrontational attack system and not between human anger and the defensive 
  
aggression system. However, this case study has larger implications for the scientific study of 
psychological kinds. The lesson is this: homology thinking can provide independent criteria 
for evaluating substantive disagreements on – and for eliminating confusion about – the 
nature of psychological kinds. In absence of homology thinking, it is difficult to see how 
further knowledge about the defensive aggression system or the offensive attack system 
would serve to determine which aggression systems in non-human animals are most like 
human anger. Indeed, this is probably one of the reasons why there has been little productive 
discussion between the advocates of the two hypotheses. Homology thinking in this case 
provides a set of independent theoretical constraints for identifying corresponding traits 
across taxa. In the service of this demonstration, I further developed some of the methods of 
homology thinking (Ereshefsky, 2007, 2012) as it applies to psychological kinds. This 
account helps to specify what kind of evidence supports homology claims, namely, 
identification of unique correspondences at the appropriate level between traits; 
correspondences that provide evidence for common ancestry as opposed to common selective 
pressures (whether developmental or ancestral). 
Though counterintuitive from some perspectives, the concept of homology helps to 
clarify what counts as evidence for claims of trait identity. Note that identical traits can have 
different states. For example, a human arm and whale fin are identical traits, because they are 
both instances of the tetrapod forelimb. Nevertheless, they are different states of that trait, 
because they represent different forms that this trait can take. Homology thinking allows the 
identification of traits that take shape in dramatically different states; it enables us to identify 
evolved characters that walk in the guise of dramatically different forms and functions. 
  
Anger is one such character. 
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